# Annex C (informative): Risk identification and assessment methodology
## C.1 Assets
- access to the management interface
- network inventory
- network topology
- market reach information
- connected devices updates, patches
- keys can be generated or imported through the keymanagement modules
- CORBA access, grcp
-
### C.1.1 Data
> What data is stored on the product?
@@ -607,11 +620,11 @@ In accordance with Article 13 (8) of the CRA<a href="#_ref_i.1">[i.1]</a>, the m
>
> Assumptions may vary by use case. For example, for a VPN, if the use case is protecting from a state actor, then you must assume focused, specific surveillance of all of the user's network traffic. If the use case is downloading a TV show only available in another country, you can assume that no one is analyzing the user's traffic.
- Proper platform
- Proper operating system
- **Rationale:** A network management system requires a trustworthy operating system to perform its functions.
- [A-PP-L-1]: The operating system is assumed to be trustworthy.
- [A-PP-L-2]: The operating system provides and enforces process isolation
- [A-POS-L-1]: The operating system is assumed to be trustworthy.
- [A-POS-L-2]: The operating system provides and enforces process isolation
- Proper administrator
@@ -619,7 +632,6 @@ In accordance with Article 13 (8) of the CRA<a href="#_ref_i.1">[i.1]</a>, the m
- [A-PA-L-1]: The administrator is assumed to be trustworthy.
- [A-PA-L-2]: The administrator is limited to protect against accidental misconfiguration.
- [A-PA-L-3]: The administrator is severely limited to protect against intentional misconfiguration.
- [A-PA-L-4]: The administrator actions can be traced in case of accidental or intentional misconfiguration.
- Not being attacked by a state actor
- Not using sophisticated or expensive hardware snooping techniques