Commit e6fc2ea9 authored by Valerie Aurora's avatar Valerie Aurora
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Update threats

parent 1497b98a
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+15 −33
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1084,15 +1084,15 @@ Suggested type of tests include, but are not limited to:
* Statistics
* Security keys for validation of access to itself (firmware, management access)
* Security keys for packet encryption or network access
* All accessible host data
* Device driver stored on device, if any
* All accessible host data and functions

#### C.1.1.2 Virtual network interfaces or device drivers

* Device driver code
* Interface configuration that is not stored by the host
* Device driver executable
* Interface configuration
* Statistics
* Security keys
* All accessible host data

### C.1.2 Product functions

@@ -1150,54 +1150,36 @@ Optional:

## C.2 Threats

Threat: Attacker sends a packet to the external adapter that causes the interface to give unauthorized access to data stored on the interface.
Threat: Attacker may get unauthorized access to data stored on the network interface, including configuration, firmware, statistics, or security keys.

Threat: Attacker sends a packet to the external adapter that causes the interface to give unauthorized access to functions on the interface.
Threat: Attacker may get unauthorized access to data transmitted via the network interface, including data intended for the network interface itself and not the host system.

Threat: Attacker sends a packet that causes the interface to give unauthorized access to some or all host system assets.
Threat: Attacker may get unauthorized access to functions of the network interface, including transmission of data, and access to host system data and functions.

Threat: Attacker uses unprivileged host access to the network interface to es the interface to give unauthorized access to data stored on the interface.
Threat: Attacker may intercept a communications channel to an authorized server and read or modify the transmitted data.

Threat: Attacker sends a packet to the external adapter that causes the interface to give unauthorized access to functions on the interface.
Threat: Attacker may masquerade as the authorized server to get unauthorized access to network interface assets.

Threat: Attacker sends a packet that causes the interface to give unauthorized access to some or all host system assets.
Threat: Attacker may degrade or stop the functions of the network interface.

Threat: Attacker may use unauthorized access to the network interface to harm other devices, including the host system.

  * Read/write firmware
  * Read/write configuration
  * Read/write statistics
  * Read/write security keys
  * Read/write packet contents
  * Stop packet processing
  * Slow down packet processing
  * Drop packets
  * Send interrupts to host
  * Reboot the host
  * Read/write host memory
Threat: Attacker may get unauthorized access to data stored in the device driver, including configuration, software, statistics, or security keys.

* Unprivileged user
Threat: Attacker may get unauthorized access to the functions of the device driver, including access to host system data and functions.

### C.2.2 Device drivers
Threat: Attacker may degrade or stop the functions of the device driver.

FIXME copy from OS

### C.2.3 Virtual interfaces

FIXME copy from OS and add the very small amount of different stuff to mitigate the specific data that is different in a virtual interface.
Threat: Attacker may use unauthorized access to the device driver to harm other devices, including the host system.

Unsorted notes

Physical interfaces:

* Incoming packets that trigger bad behaviour
  * Bug that processing incoming packets stops packet processing
    * TR: stress testing with just a lot of packets of different types?
* Bugs in chipset allowing unauthorized/malformed access to interface
* Malicious/corrupted firmware updates - do this securely
  * TR: the firmware update method must verify firmware in some way
  * note that update can be done OS or other stuff
  * IoT things updated over wifi
* Bluetooth is exposed to the world and very common
* development/debug commands accessible externally from host
  * TR: debug interfaces disabled by default
  * TR: debug interface is only used by authorized users via SoTA