Spelling and formatting fixes

The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.

<mark> NONE AT PRESENT </mark>

> NONE AT PRESENT

- <a name="_ref_1">[1]</a>    &lt;Standard Organization acronym> &lt;document number> (&lt;version number>): "&lt;Title>".

* <a name="_ref_i.4">[i.4]</a>    EN 18031-3 (2024): “Common security requirements for radio equipment - Part 3: Internet connected radio equipment processing virtual money or monetary value".

<mark> FIXME add or delete informative references as work progresses </mark>

> FIXME add or delete informative references as work progresses

# 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations

|**IT**        | Information Technology                   |

|**OS**        | Operating System                         |

<mark> FIXME add more abbreviations as necessary </mark>

> FIXME add more abbreviations as necessary

# 4 Product context

It also includes the following parts if they are sold with the interface:

* Device driver

* Removable/changable antenna

* Removable/changeable antenna

* Daughter boards/add-on hardware modules

A virtual network interface consists of a device driver only.

Each security level will consist of the security requirements necessary to mitigate the threats related to the associated levels of risk factors.

<mark> FIXME add security requirements when they exist </mark>

> FIXME add security requirements when they exist

| Security level | USR     | ACC     | COM     | ADM     |

|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|

## 4.7 Essential functions

### 4.7.1 Physical interface essential functons

### 4.7.1 Physical interface essential functions

* Receive and transmit data between host and network at data link layer

* Carry out host commands (power, config, tx/rx)

* Packet encryption at data link layer

* Packet encryption at network layer

### 4.7.2 Device driver essential functons

### 4.7.2 Device driver essential functions

* Bridge between network device interface and host software

* Handle interrupts, set up tx/rx, copy statistics, etc.

* Support optional features of the underlying hardware or software

### 4.7.3 Virtual interface essential functons

### 4.7.3 Virtual interface essential functions

* Bridge between host OS device driver interface and other software

> - PT2 drafts, available in the [ETSI DocBox](https://docbox.etsi.org/CYBER/CYBER/CEN-CLC/JTC13/WG09)

> - ENISA's [CRA Requirements Standards Mapping](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-11/Cyber%20Resilience%20Act%20Requirements%20Standards%20Mapping%20-%20final_with_identifiers_0.pdf)

<mark> FIXME actually add security requirements </mark>

> FIXME actually add security requirements

<mark> FIXME random unsorted notes, to be updated </mark>

> FIXME random unsorted notes, to be updated

Where is the manufacturer the best place to mitigate the risks? Those should be the ones the manufacturer treats, otherwise they are documented for the integrator.

> Table mapping technical security requirements from Section 5 of the present document to essential cybersecurity requirements in Annex I of the CRA. The purpose of this is to help identify missing technical security requirements.

<mark> FIXME add requirements when they exist </mark>

> FIXME add requirements when they exist

| CRA requirement                                 | Technical security requirements(s) |

|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|

* All network packets going in and out

* Device configuration

<mark> FIXME add assets for device driver and virtual interface </mark>

> FIXME add assets for device driver and virtual interface

### C.1.2 Product functions

> Example threats can be found in the same documents suggested in the section on security requirements.

<mark> FIXME partial notes, need more threats, need to associate with risk factors </mark>

> FIXME partial notes, need more threats, need to associate with risk factors

Virtual interfaces: all the same issues as device drivers: bad pointer, buffer overflow, memory management errors, bad logic, etc.

Physical interfaces:

* Copying data beyond end of packet and putting it on the network

* Incoming packets that trigger bad behaviour

* Bugs in chipset allowing unauthorized access to interface

* Bluetooth is exposed to the world and very common

  * development/debug commands on wireless things

FIXME lookup CVEs - anything from host-generated packets?

> FIXME lookup CVEs - anything from host-generated packets?

https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01335.html

> List assumptions that are relevant to the risk analysis for these threats. Everything is hackable if you try hard enough. What kinds of threats are in and out of scope? What are you assuming is the sophistication of attack? Relate to use cases.

<mark> FIXME more assumptions, associate with risk factors and security requirements </mark>

> FIXME more assumptions, associate with risk factors and security requirements

- Not being attacked by a state actor

- Not using sophisticated or expensive hardware snooping techniques

> NOTE 3 A quantitative estimation of the cybersecurity risks can be performed using scoring systems that map qualitative categories of the likelihood of occurrence and qualitative categories of magnitude of loss or disruption to certain values.

<mark> FIXME pick methodology </mark>

> FIXME pick methodology

# Annex D (informative): Risk evaluation guidance

<mark> FIXME random notes below, should be rewritten or deleted when no longer necessary </mark>

> FIXME random notes below, should be rewritten or deleted when no longer necessary

For each network interface placed on the market, the manufacturer shall develop a threat model and risk profile of the forseeable use of the operating system, and shall consider the interplay between:

For each network interface placed on the market, the manufacturer shall develop a threat model and risk profile of the foreseeable use of the operating system, and shall consider the interplay between:

* complexity of forseeable use

* likelihood of an incident, given the forseeable use

* impact of an incident, given the forseeable use

* Complexity of foreseeable use

* Likelihood of an incident, given the foreseeable use

* Impact of an incident, given the foreseeable use

Attack vectors that are the responsiblity of the network interface:

Attack vectors that are the responsibility of the network interface:

* Arbitrary packets from outside the system

* OS-validated packets from unprivileged users inside the system