Loading EN-304-624.md +84 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -2357,6 +2357,90 @@ REFERENCE: ACC_PKI_DM_04 - EVIDENCE: The documentation of supported export methods. ## 6.9 Availability protection ## 6.9.1 AP - Certificate suspension and revocation - REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-AP-01 - OBJECTIVE: - Verify that revoked certificates cannot be returned to a valid status after revocation. - PREPARATION: - Obtain certificate lifecycle management documentation. - Obtain certificate status management procedures and configurations. - Prepare test certificates and authorized administrative accounts. - ACTIVITIES: - Issue a test certificate. - Revoke the certificate using the supported revocation procedure. - Verify that the certificate status changes to revoked. - Attempt to reinstate, reactivate, or remove the revocation status of the certificate. - Verify that all attempts to restore the certificate to a valid state are rejected. - VERDICT: - SUCCESS: - Once revoked, the certificate permanently remains in the revoked state. - No administrative interface or API permits reinstatement. - FAIL: - A revoked certificate can be returned to a valid state. - Revocation information can be modified to remove the revoked status. - EVIDENCE: - Certificate lifecycle procedures. - Certificate status records. - Revocation logs. - Administrative interface screenshots. - Test execution records. - REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-AP-02 - OBJECTIVE: - Verify that CRLs contain a valid `nextUpdate` field and that the special value `99991231235959Z` is used only for the final CRL. - PREPARATION: - Determine whether CRLs are supported. - Obtain CRL generation procedures and configuration documentation. - Prepare CRL inspection tools. - ACTIVITIES: - Generate one or more CRLs. - Inspect the `nextUpdate` field in each CRL. - Verify that ordinary CRLs contain the next scheduled issue time. - Where applicable, generate the final CRL and verify that `nextUpdate` is set to `99991231235959Z`. - Verify that no non-final CRL uses the special value. - VERDICT: - SUCCESS: - All generated CRLs contain a valid `nextUpdate` field. - The special value is used only for the final CRL. - FAIL: - A CRL omits the `nextUpdate` field. - The special value is incorrectly used or omitted. - EVIDENCE: - CRL configuration files. - Generated CRLs. - CRL inspection outputs. - Test records. - REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-AP-03 - OBJECTIVE: - Verify that CRLs are digitally signed by the CA or an authorized entity designated by the TSP. - PREPARATION: - Determine whether CRLs are supported. - CRL signing procedures and trust model documentation. - Prepare certificate and signature validation tools. - ACTIVITIES: - Generate CRLs. - Inspect the signer identity and signature information. - Verify that the signer corresponds to the CA or an authorized delegated entity. - Validate the digital signature. - Attempt to validate a CRL modified after signing. - VERDICT: - SUCCESS: - All CRLs are signed by authorized entities. - Signature validation succeeds. - Tampered CRLs fail validation. - FAIL: - CRLs are unsigned. - CRLs are signed by unauthorized entities. - Signature validation does not detect tampering. - EVIDENCE: - CRL samples. - Signature validation reports. - Trust model documentation. - Delegation documentation. - Test execution records. ## 6.10 Impact minimisation Loading Loading
EN-304-624.md +84 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -2357,6 +2357,90 @@ REFERENCE: ACC_PKI_DM_04 - EVIDENCE: The documentation of supported export methods. ## 6.9 Availability protection ## 6.9.1 AP - Certificate suspension and revocation - REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-AP-01 - OBJECTIVE: - Verify that revoked certificates cannot be returned to a valid status after revocation. - PREPARATION: - Obtain certificate lifecycle management documentation. - Obtain certificate status management procedures and configurations. - Prepare test certificates and authorized administrative accounts. - ACTIVITIES: - Issue a test certificate. - Revoke the certificate using the supported revocation procedure. - Verify that the certificate status changes to revoked. - Attempt to reinstate, reactivate, or remove the revocation status of the certificate. - Verify that all attempts to restore the certificate to a valid state are rejected. - VERDICT: - SUCCESS: - Once revoked, the certificate permanently remains in the revoked state. - No administrative interface or API permits reinstatement. - FAIL: - A revoked certificate can be returned to a valid state. - Revocation information can be modified to remove the revoked status. - EVIDENCE: - Certificate lifecycle procedures. - Certificate status records. - Revocation logs. - Administrative interface screenshots. - Test execution records. - REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-AP-02 - OBJECTIVE: - Verify that CRLs contain a valid `nextUpdate` field and that the special value `99991231235959Z` is used only for the final CRL. - PREPARATION: - Determine whether CRLs are supported. - Obtain CRL generation procedures and configuration documentation. - Prepare CRL inspection tools. - ACTIVITIES: - Generate one or more CRLs. - Inspect the `nextUpdate` field in each CRL. - Verify that ordinary CRLs contain the next scheduled issue time. - Where applicable, generate the final CRL and verify that `nextUpdate` is set to `99991231235959Z`. - Verify that no non-final CRL uses the special value. - VERDICT: - SUCCESS: - All generated CRLs contain a valid `nextUpdate` field. - The special value is used only for the final CRL. - FAIL: - A CRL omits the `nextUpdate` field. - The special value is incorrectly used or omitted. - EVIDENCE: - CRL configuration files. - Generated CRLs. - CRL inspection outputs. - Test records. - REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-AP-03 - OBJECTIVE: - Verify that CRLs are digitally signed by the CA or an authorized entity designated by the TSP. - PREPARATION: - Determine whether CRLs are supported. - CRL signing procedures and trust model documentation. - Prepare certificate and signature validation tools. - ACTIVITIES: - Generate CRLs. - Inspect the signer identity and signature information. - Verify that the signer corresponds to the CA or an authorized delegated entity. - Validate the digital signature. - Attempt to validate a CRL modified after signing. - VERDICT: - SUCCESS: - All CRLs are signed by authorized entities. - Signature validation succeeds. - Tampered CRLs fail validation. - FAIL: - CRLs are unsigned. - CRLs are signed by unauthorized entities. - Signature validation does not detect tampering. - EVIDENCE: - CRL samples. - Signature validation reports. - Trust model documentation. - Delegation documentation. - Test execution records. ## 6.10 Impact minimisation Loading
