@@ -1073,18 +1073,26 @@ The considered threats for the C-ITS PKI are illustrated in the following figure
- REFERENCE: REQ-5.1-06
- REQUIREMENT: The PKI shall prevent auditable events, except those taken by the auditor, if the audit log is full.
- RATIONALE: If the PKI system is properly deployed—with appropriate policies, effective system management, and regular log reviews—an overload of logs should be seen as a symptom of a potentially significant security issue. In such cases, corrective actions should be taken before operations return to normal. Meanwhile, a full audit log should never result in the loss of old audit records or prevent future auditable events from being recorded. The audit record intergrity and availability ensure that all auditable events are traceable and misuse of the PKI functions can be traced. It covers misuse of users and administrators fonction : T_SYS02, T_SYS04, T_SYS05, T_SYS07, T_SYS10, T_REG01, T_REG03, T.Logs_Tampering, T.Logs_Discolsure
- APPLICABILITY: All use cases.
- APPLICABILITY: Not applicable when PKI system operates using log rotation/pruning or any other mechanisms ensuring that audit logs cannot be full.
- REFERENCE: REQ-5.1-07
- REQUIREMENT: The PKI shall periodically create an audit log signing event in which it computes a digital signature, keyed hash, or authentication code over the entries in the audit log. The digital signature, keyed hash, or authentication code shall be computed over, at least:
a) every entry that has been added to the audit log since the previous audit log signing event;
b) the digital signature, keyed hash, or authentication code from the previous audit log signed event. The digital signature, keyed hash, or authentication code from the audit log signing event shall be included in the audit log.
- RATIONALE: All entries of the audit log, and the order and exhaustivity of batches of entries should impact authenticity checks of the audit log. The audit record integrity ensure that all auditable events are traceable and misuse of the PKI functions can be traced. It covers misuse of users and administrators function : T_SYS02, T_SYS04, T_SYS05, T_SYS07, T_SYS10, T_REG01, T_REG03, T.Logs_Tampering, T.Logs_Discolsure.
NOTE: An audit log signing event is performed even if no entry was added to the audit log since the last one.
- APPLICABILITY: UC3 and UC4
• REFERENCE: REQ-5.1-09
- REQUIREMENT: The PKI shall ensure the integrity of audit logs.
- RATIONALE: Integrity protection of audit logs ensures that all auditable events are traceable and that PKI operations can be reliably tracked for accountability and security monitoring. Not all integrity protection mechanisms can be foreseen so for
It covers misuse of users and administrators function : T_SYS02,T_SYS05, T_SYS07, T_SYS10, T_REG01, T_REG03, T.Logs_Tampering, T.Logs_Discolsure.
- APPLICABILITY: UC1, UC2
- NOTE: Not all integrity protection mechanisms can be foreseen so for use cases with lower regulation of standardization constraints (UC1, UC2) other appoaches can be valid and so not identified here.
- RATIONALE: All entries of the audit log, and the order and exhaustivity of batches of entries should impact authenticity checks of the audit log. The audit record intergrity ensure that all auditable events are traceable and misuse of the PKI functions can be traced. It covers misuse of users and administrators fonction : T_SYS02, T_SYS04, T_SYS05, T_SYS07, T_SYS10, T_REG01, T_REG03, T.Logs_Tampering, T.Logs_Discolsure.
- NOTE: An audit log signing event shall be performed even if no entry was added to the audit log since the last one.
- APPLICABILITY: All use cases
- REFERENCE: REQ-5.1-08
- REQUIREMENT: The specified frequency at which the audit log signing event occurs shall be configurable.
@@ -1099,9 +1107,8 @@ The considered threats for the C-ITS PKI are illustrated in the following figure
- APPLICABILITY: All use cases
- REFERENCE: REQ-5.2-02
- REQUIREMENT: The PKI shall not persistently store private keys in plaintext form.
- REQUIREMENT: Private keys shall be stored within secure cryptographic device or encrypted using approved algorithms as defined in Annex K using independently managed keys.
- RATIONALE: To ensure trust the PKI software must rely on secure and valid key creation and management systems accessible only to authorised users provided by hardware security devices. It covers key tampering and disclosure threats: T_GEN01 to T_GEN08, T.Stored_Certificates_Tampering.
- NOTE: The PKI may store private keys in a secure cryptograhic device.
- APPLICABILITY: All use cases.
- REFERENCE: REQ-5.2-03
@@ -1122,10 +1129,9 @@ The considered threats for the C-ITS PKI are illustrated in the following figure
- APPLICABILITY: Where the PKI temporarily manipulates secrets in plaintext form.
- REFERENCE: REQ-5.2-05
- REQUIREMENT: The PKI shall not export private or symmetric keys in plaintext form.
- REQUIREMENT: If the PKI exports private or symmetric keys it shall use state of the art techniques for guaranteeing its confidentiality as defined in Annex K.
- RATIONALE: A secret key should not be compromised if its exported form is intercepted.
- NOTE: The form of the exported private or symmetric key shall follow state of the art techniques guaranteeing its confidentiality.
- EXAMPLES: The exported private or symmetric key may be encrypted such that only its designated recipient may decrypt it.
- EXAMPLES: The exported private or symmetric key can be encrypted such that only its designated recipient can decrypt it.
