@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ This clause addresses the requirements in the CRA [\[i.1\]](#_ref_i.1) Annex 1 P
- APPLICABILITY: UC2, UC3, UC4 and UC5
- REFERENCE: REQ-PKI-CON-06
- REQUIREMENT: The product shall implement a chosen set of cryptographic algorithms to decrypt data that has been confidentiality-protected using a known key (e.g., via encryption), ensuring it can recover the plaintext data. Those cryptographic mechanisms shall conform to the general state of the art as defined in Annex K.
- REQUIREMENT: The product shall implement a chosen set of cryptographic algorithms to decrypt data that has been confidentiality-protected using a known key, ensuring it can recover the plaintext data. Those cryptographic mechanisms shall conform to the general state of the art as defined in Annex K.
- RATIONALE: Communication with external components requires to encrypt use case sensitive data using state of the art mechanisms (cf. Annex K rational).
- APPLICABILITY: UC1, UC2, UC3 and UC5
@@ -1026,8 +1026,8 @@ This clause addresses the requirements in the CRA [\[i.1\]](#_ref_i.1) Annex 1 P
- APPLICABILITY: All use cases.
- REFERENCE: REQ-PKI-INT-10
- REQUIREMENT - [CONDITIONAL]: If Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) concerning end users certificates including any variants (e.g. Delta CRLs) are used, the CRL shall be signed using a valid certificate.
- NOTE: This requirement is derived from CSS-6.3.9-08 contained in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [\[i.10\]](#_ref_i.10)
- REQUIREMENT - [CONDITIONAL]: If Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) concerning end users certificates including any variants are used, the CRL shall be signed using a valid certificate.
- NOTE: This requirement is derived from CSS-6.3.9-08 contained in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [\[i.10\]](#_ref_i.10). Example of variant can be Delta CRLs.
- RATIONALE: If the CRL is not signed by the CA or a TSP-appointed entity, it may be usurped to mislead end-users regarding a certificate's status.
- APPLICABILITY: Where the product has a certificate status service, issuing CRLs.
@@ -1048,8 +1048,9 @@ This clause addresses the requirements in the CRA [\[i.1\]](#_ref_i.1) Annex 1 P
- APPLICABILITY: UC1, UC2, UC3, and UC5
- REFERENCE: REQ-PKI-DM-03
- REQUIREMENT: The product shall only maintain and process user data necessary for certificate management (e.g. certificate requests, updates).
- REQUIREMENT: The product shall only maintain and process user data necessary for certificate management.
- RATIONALE: For each use case, only user data necessary for the certificate management functions identified in Annex U are required.
- NOTE: Example of such data can be: certificate requests, updates, etc.
- APPLICABILITY: All use cases.
### 5.8.2 DM - Secret management
@@ -1072,7 +1073,7 @@ In this section we consider that certificates status availability and trust are
- APPLICABILITY: All use cases where the product has a certificate generation service, issuing public-key certificates.
- REFERENCE: REQ-PKI-AP-02
- REQUIREMENT - [CONDITIONAL]: If Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) concerning end users certificates including any variants (e.g. Delta CRLs) are used as defined and provide a nextUpdate field, every CRL shall state a time for next scheduled CRL issue, unless it is the last CRL issued for those certificates in the scope of the CRL, in which case the nextUpdate field in the CRL, shall be set to "99991231235959Z".
- REQUIREMENT - [CONDITIONAL]: If Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) concerning end users certificates including any variants are used as defined and provide a nextUpdate field, every CRL shall state a time for next scheduled CRL issue, unless it is the last CRL issued for those certificates in the scope of the CRL, in which case the nextUpdate field in the CRL, shall be set to "99991231235959Z".
- NOTE: This requirement is derived from CSS-6.3.9-06 contained in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [\[i.10\]](#_ref_i.10)
- RATIONALE: The inclusion of an expiry of the CRL's validity reduces the ability of an attacker to replay the CRL to its users, and enables caching for end-users. The special value of that field in the event the next update would be the CRL issuer expires ensures the status information is valid until that expiry.
- APPLICABILITY: Where the product has a certificate status service, issuing CRLs according to REQ-PKI-EMM-08 and REQ-PKI-EMM-09.
@@ -1197,7 +1198,7 @@ To limit certificate forgery or misuse of certificate content, this section defi
- APPLICABILITY: U2, UC3, UC4, UC5, applicable only if REQ-PKI-EMM-01a is used.
- REFERENCE: REQ-PKI-EMM-07
- REQUIREMENT: The product shall verify that the prospective certificate subject possesses the private key corresponding to the public key contained in the certificate request by means of a cryptographic challenge (e.g., signature generation or decryption) before issuing a certificate, unless the public/private key pair was generated by the product and has never left the certificate issuance service.
- REQUIREMENT: The product shall verify that the prospective certificate subject possesses the private key corresponding to the public key contained in the certificate request by means of a cryptographic challenge before issuing a certificate, unless the public/private key pair was generated by the product and has never left the certificate issuance service.
- RATIONALE: A subject bringing forth his own public key should prove ownership of the corresponding private key. The product can generate a key pair and associated public key, and later communicate the private key to the correct subject in a secure manner. This can notably be done for other components of the product itself needing public-key certificates. The same private key should not be owned by distinct subjects, including other services of the product; if the private key was generated by the product but already provided to the subject once, the subject can and should prove its ownership.
