Commit be34722a authored by Sammy Haddad's avatar Sammy Haddad
Browse files

AP ass. req.

parent 7cffda54
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@@ -2426,6 +2426,194 @@ REFERENCE: ACC_PKI_DM_04
    - Delegation documentation.
    - Test execution records.

- REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-AP-04
- OBJECTIVE:
  - Verify that CARLs are generated at least annually and that the `nextUpdate` value does not exceed one year after issuance.
- PREPARATION:
  - Determine whether CARLs are supported.
  - CARL generation procedures and scheduling configuration.
  - Prepare CARL inspection tools.
  - Product in executable state.
- ACTIVITIES:
  - Review CARL generation schedules.
  - Generate or inspect existing CARLs.
  - Verify the issuance dates and `nextUpdate` values.
  - Calculate the interval between issuance and `nextUpdate`.
  - Verify that the interval does not exceed one year.
- VERDICT:
  - SUCCESS:
    - CARLs are generated at least once per year.
    - `nextUpdate` is not more than one year after issuance.
  - FAIL:
    - CARLs are not generated annually.
    - `nextUpdate` exceeds one year.
- EVIDENCE:
  - CARL schedules.
  - Generated CARLs.
  - CARL inspection reports.
  - System logs.

- REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-AP-05
  - OBJECTIVE:
    - Verify that revocation of a CA certificate immediately triggers generation of a new CARL.
  - PREPARATION:
    - Determine whether CARLs are supported.
    - Obtain CA revocation procedures and CARL generation procedures.
    - Prepare test CA certificates.
    - Product in executable state.
  - ACTIVITIES:
    - Revoke a CA certificate.
    - Monitor the system response.
    - Verify that a new CARL is generated after revocation.
    - Verify that the revoked CA certificate is included in the CARL.
    - Verify that generation events are logged.
  - VERDICT:
    - SUCCESS:
      - A new CARL is generated after CA certificate revocation.
      - The revoked CA certificate appears in the CARL.
    - FAIL:
      - No new CARL is generated.
      - The revoked CA certificate is omitted.
  - EVIDENCE:
    - Revocation logs.
    - Generated CARLs.
    - System event logs.
    - Test reports.

### 6.9.2 AP - Certificate status services

- REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-AP-06
  - OBJECTIVE:
    - Verify that revocation status information remains available until certificate expiration.
  - PREPARATION:
    - Obtain certificate status service documentation.
    - Product in executable state.
    - Prepare certificates with varying validity periods.
  - ACTIVITIES:
    - Issue and revoke test certificates.
    - Query certificate status information during the certificate validity period.
    - Verify that status information remains available until expiration.
    - Verify behavior immediately after expiration.
  - VERDICT:
    - SUCCESS:
      - Status information remains available until certificate expiration.
    - FAIL:
      - Status information becomes unavailable before certificate expiration.
  - EVIDENCE:
    - Status service configuration.
    - Certificate status responses.
    - Test records.
  - Service logs.

- REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-AP-07
  - OBJECTIVE:
    - Verify that the product supports at least one certificate status mechanism: OCSP or CRL.
  - PREPARATION:
    - Obtain product documentation.
    - Prepare OCSP and CRL validation tools.
    - Product in executable state.
  - ACTIVITIES:
    - Identify supported certificate status services.
    - Verify configuration and operation of each supported service.
    - Query certificate status information.
    - Verify that responses accurately reflect certificate status.
  - VERDICT:
    - SUCCESS:
      - At least one certificate status mechanism is implemented and operational.
    - FAIL:
      - Neither OCSP nor CRL functionality is supported.
  - EVIDENCE:
    - Product documentation.
    - Configuration files.
    - Status responses.
    - Test records.

- REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-AP-08
  - OBJECTIVE:
    - Verify that multiple certificate status services provide consistent certificate status information.
  - PREPARATION:
    - Determine supported status mechanisms.
    - Prepare certificates and status query tools.
    - Product in executable state.
  - ACTIVITIES:
    - Issue and revoke test certificates.
    - Query all supported status services.
    - Record responses over time.
    - Verify that status information remains consistent, considering expected propagation delays.
    - Verify that discrepancies are temporary and documented.
  - VERDICT:
    - SUCCESS:
      - All status mechanisms eventually provide consistent status information.
      - Any temporary differences are within documented synchronization periods.
    - FAIL:
      - Status information remains inconsistent.
      - Different services provide contradictory certificate statuses.
  - EVIDENCE:
    - Status service configurations.
    - Status responses.
    - Synchronization documentation.
    - Test reports.

### 6.9.3 AP - Key management
- REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-AP-09
  - OBJECTIVE:
    - Verify that the product can generate, store, and manage multiple key pairs simultaneously.
  - PREPARATION:
    - Key management documentation.
    - Prepare administrative access and test environments.
    - Product in executable state.
  - ACTIVITIES:
    - Generate multiple key pairs.
    - Assign key pairs to different services, authorities, or purposes.
    - Verify that multiple key pairs coexist without conflict.
    - Verify that management operations can be performed independently on each key pair.
    - Verify support for key lifecycle activities such as activation and rotation.
  - VERDICT:
    - SUCCESS:
      - Multiple key pairs can be maintained simultaneously.
      - Key management operations function independently for each key pair.
    - FAIL:
      - Multiple key pairs cannot coexist.
      - Management operations interfere with other key pairs.
  - EVIDENCE:
    - Key management documentation.
    - Key inventories.
    - Administrative screenshots.
    - System logs.
    - Test records.

- REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-AP-10
  - OBJECTIVE:
    - Verify that authorized users can delete keys and that unauthorized users cannot perform key deletion.
  - PREPARATION:
    - Key management procedures.
    - Prepare authorized and unauthorized user accounts for key deletion.
    - Generate test key pairs.
  - ACTIVITIES:
    - Generate test key pairs.
    - Delete keys using authorized accounts.
    - Verify successful deletion and removal of associated key references.
    - Attempt key deletion using unauthorized accounts.
    - Verify that unauthorized deletion attempts are denied and logged.
  - VERDICT:
    - SUCCESS:
      - Authorized users can successfully delete keys.
      - Unauthorized users cannot delete keys.
      - Key deletion events are logged.
    - FAIL:
      - Authorized users cannot delete keys.
      - Unauthorized users can delete keys.
      - Key deletion events are not properly recorded.
      - Keys are still accessible or usable after erasure request.
  - EVIDENCE:
    - Key management procedures.
    - Access control configurations.
    - System and audit logs.
    - Administrative screenshots.
    - Test execution records.
  


## 6.10 Impact minimisation

## 6.11 Minimisation of attack surfaces