Update file EN-304-624.md

## 6.6 Confidentiality

Validity of cryptographic mechanisms shall conform to Annex K assement requirements: 

  - REQ-PKI-CON-02

  - REQ-PKI-CON-04

  - REQ-PKI-CON-05

  - REQ-PKI-CON-06

  - REQ-PKI-CON-07

  - REQ-PKI-CON-08

Validity of access control requirement are covered by section 6.5:

- REQ-PKI-CON-01

* OBJECTIVE:

  Verify that when a pseudonymous certificate is used to exchange a public key associated with an ephemeral identity, the certificate contains no information that could directly or indirectly reveal, correlate, or facilitate identification of the sender, thereby preserving sender pseudonymity.

* PREPARATION:

  * Obtain the product security architecture documentation describing the implementation of pseudonymous certificates and ephemeral identities.

  * Obtain the certificate profile specification, including all mandatory and optional certificate fields and extensions.

  * Obtain sample pseudonymous certificates generated by the product.

  * Obtain PKI configuration settings governing certificate generation and identity management.

  * Prepare tools for certificate parsing and inspection (e.g., OpenSSL or ASN.1 decoders).

  * Identify any external repositories, certificate databases, or services that may be used to correlate certificate information.

* ACTIVITIES:

  1. Review the product design documentation to determine how pseudonymous certificates are generated and associated with ephemeral identities.

  2. Examine the certificate profile and identify all fields and extensions included in the pseudonymous certificate.

  3. Inspect sample certificates and verify that subject names, subject alternative names, serial numbers, issuer attributes, custom extensions, identifiers, URLs, metadata, or any other fields do not contain:

     * Personally identifiable information (PII);

     * Persistent identifiers linked to a specific user or device;

     * Information that permits direct or indirect sender identification;

     * Values that can be correlated across multiple certificates to establish sender identity.

  4. Verify that any included certificate information is strictly limited to technical information necessary for certificate validation and cryptographic operation.

  5. Assess whether certificate serial number generation, extension values, and metadata are randomly generated or otherwise designed to prevent sender correlation.

  6. Review product configuration and operational procedures to ensure that pseudonymous certificates cannot be configured to include identifying information.

  7. Attempt to correlate multiple pseudonymous certificates issued to the same sender and determine whether any certificate data enables identity linkage.

* VERDICT:

  * SUCCESS:

    * The product generates pseudonymous certificates containing only technical information necessary for cryptographic processing and validation.

    * No certificate field or extension contains identifying information, persistent identifiers, or metadata that can directly or indirectly reveal the sender's identity.

    * Multiple certificates associated with the same sender cannot be correlated using certificate contents.

    * Product configuration prevents the inclusion of identifying information in pseudonymous certificates.

  * FAIL:

    * One or more certificate fields contain information that directly or indirectly identifies the sender.

    * Certificate contents include persistent identifiers or metadata that enable correlation of certificates belonging to the same sender.

    * Certificate serial numbers, extensions, naming conventions, or custom attributes permit sender re-identification.

    * Product configuration allows pseudonymous certificates to include user-related identifying information.

* EVIDENCE:

  * Product architecture and design documentation describing pseudonymous certificate generation.

  * Certificate profile specifications and extension definitions.

  * Parsed representations of sample pseudonymous certificates.

  * Configuration files and settings controlling certificate generation.

  * Assessment records demonstrating inspection of certificate fields and extensions.

  * Correlation analysis results showing that certificate contents cannot be used to identify or link the sender.

  * Assessor observations and test logs supporting the final determination.

## 6.7 Integrity

Assessment requirements covering Monitoring are presented in section 6.13.

The validity of the cryptographic mechanisms used to encure those funtions is covered by annex K assessment requirement.

## 6.8 Data minimisation

### 6.8.1 General

  - Memory analysis and test results.

  - Assessment records demonstrating key handling and destruction procedures.

### 6.8.2 Secret management

- REFERENCE: ACC_PKI_DM_03