Commit 78ab79c9 authored by Sammy Haddad's avatar Sammy Haddad
Browse files

6.6.1 update

parent 20edf911
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+66 −39
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1719,12 +1719,43 @@ The following requirement of cryptographic mechanisms validity shall conform to
Validity of access control requirement are covered by section 6.5:
- REQ-PKI-CON-01

## 6.6.1 CON - General


- REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-DM-01  
- REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-CON-01
  -  OBJECTIVE:
  Verify that when a pseudonymous certificate is used to exchange a public key associated with an ephemeral identity, the certificate contains no information that could directly or indirectly reveal, correlate, or facilitate identification of the sender, thereby preserving sender pseudonymity.

    - Verify that private keys generated by the product are protected against unauthorized export, copying, disclosure, or removal.
  -  PREPARATION:
    -  (If available) Key management architecture documentation.
    -  Documentation describing private key generation, storage, and access controls.
    -  Identify interfaces, APIs, administrative functions, backup mechanisms, and export capabilities that may provide access to private keys.
    -  Access to authorized and unauthorized user accounts.
  -  ACTIVITIES:
    - (If available) Review the design of private key generation and storage mechanisms.
    - Verify that generated private keys are stored in protected locations or secure cryptographic devices.
    - Verify that export or copy operations require explicit authorization.
    - Attempt to access, export, copy, or remove private keys using unauthorized accounts and interfaces.
    - Verify that unauthorized operations are denied and appropriately logged.
    - Where controlled migration of key pairs is supported, verify that transfer is performed only under documented and authorized procedures.
  -  VERDICT:
    -  SUCCESS:
      -  Unauthorized users cannot access, export, copy, or remove private keys.
      -  All key management interfaces enforce authorization controls.
      -  Any permitted key transfer mechanisms are appropriately controlled and documented.
    -  FAIL:
      -  Unauthorized users can obtain, copy, export, or remove private keys.
      -  Key protection mechanisms can be bypassed.
      -  Key migration mechanisms lack appropriate controls.
  -  EVIDENCE:
    -  Key management design documentation.
    -  Access control configurations.
    -  Security architecture diagrams.
    -  Test results of attempted unauthorized exports.
    -  Audit logs of key management operations.
    -  Configuration files and screenshots.

- REFERENCE: ACC-PKI-DM-02
  - OBJECTIVE:
    - Verify that when a pseudonymous certificate is used to exchange a public key associated with an ephemeral identity, the certificate contains no information that could directly or indirectly reveal, correlate, or facilitate identification of the sender, thereby preserving sender pseudonymity.
  -  PREPARATION:
      -  Product security architecture documentation describing the implementation of pseudonymous certificates and ephemeral identities.  
      -  The certificate profile specification, including all mandatory and optional certificate fields and extensions.
@@ -1732,7 +1763,6 @@ Validity of access control requirement are covered by section 6.5:
      -  Product configuration settings for certificate generation and identity management.
      -  Tools for certificate parsing and inspection.
      -  Identify any external repositories, certificate databases, or services that may be used to correlate certificate information.

  -  ACTIVITIES:
    - Review the product design documentation to determine how pseudonymous certificates are generated and associated with ephemeral identities.
    - Examine the certificate profile and identify all fields and extensions included in the pseudonymous certificate.
@@ -1745,20 +1775,17 @@ Validity of access control requirement are covered by section 6.5:
      - Assess whether certificate serial number generation, extension values, and metadata are randomly generated or otherwise designed to prevent sender correlation.
      - Review product configuration and operational procedures to ensure that pseudonymous certificates cannot be configured to include identifying information.
      - Attempt to correlate multiple pseudonymous certificates issued to the same sender and determine whether any certificate data enables identity linkage.

  -  VERDICT:
    -  SUCCESS:
        - The product generates pseudonymous certificates containing only technical information necessary for cryptographic processing and validation.
        - No certificate field or extension contains identifying information, persistent identifiers, or metadata that can directly or indirectly reveal the sender's identity.
        - Multiple certificates associated with the same sender cannot be correlated using certificate contents.
        - Product configuration prevents the inclusion of identifying information in pseudonymous certificates.

    -  FAIL:
      -  One or more certificate fields contain information that directly or indirectly identifies the sender.
      -  Certificate contents include persistent identifiers or metadata that enable correlation of certificates belonging to the same sender.
      -  Certificate serial numbers, extensions, naming conventions, or custom attributes permit sender re-identification.
      -  Product configuration allows pseudonymous certificates to include user-related identifying information.

  -  EVIDENCE:
    -  Product architecture and design documentation describing pseudonymous certificate generation.
    -  Certificate profile specifications and extension definitions.