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# 1 Scope

The present document specifies requirements and assessment criteria covering all elements defined in CRA Annex I Part 1 and Part 2 for Public key infrastructure (PKI) and digital certificate issuance software.

The present document specifies requirements and assessment criteria covering all elements defined in CRA [\[i.2\]](#_ref_i.2) Annex I Part 1 and Part 2 for Public key infrastructure (PKI) and digital certificate issuance software.

The present document covers the specification of Security Profiles (SP) for the main PKI use cases to demonstrate compliance with requirements in the EU Regulation 2024/2847 under the conditions identified in annex. 

The present document covers the specification of Security Profiles (SP) for the main PKI use cases to demonstrate compliance with requirements in the EU Regulation 2024/2847 under the conditions identified in annex D. 

Different uses cases represent different deployment with different sets of architectures, functionalities and thus associated threats and risk. The document specifies requirements to cover or mitigate those risks in conformity with the CRA.

| Term  | Definition             |

|--------------|-------------------------|

|PKI Software||

|PKI Software| Software implementing the PKI services: Registration, Certificate generation, Dissemination, Revocation management, Certificate status, Logging of security events, User accounts management, etc.|

|Certificate| Public key of a user, together with some other information, rendered un-forgeable by encipherment with the private key of the certification authority which issued it. |

|Certificate Policy (CP) | Named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements. |

|Certificate Revocation List (CRL) | signed list indicating a set of certificates that have been revoked by the certificate issuer.|

`TSL    Trust-service Status List`  

`TSP    Trust Service Provider`  

`CRA     Cyber Resilience Act`

`CSR     Certificate Signing Request`

`NIS2    Network and Information Security Directive 2`

`API     Application Programming Interface`

`AES     Advanced Encryption Standard`

`AID     Authentication Identifier`

`SSP     Service Specific Permission`

`HMAC    Hash-based Message Authentication Code`

`SHA     Secure Hash Algorithm`

`URL     Uniform Resource Locator`

`IEEE    Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers`

`CTL     Certificate Trust List`

`ECTL    Extended Certificate Trust List`

`SubCA   Subordinate Certificate Authority`

`AE      Authentication Entity`

`TAE     Target of Assessment`

`PP      Protection Profile`

`CSP     Cloud Service Provider / Cryptographic Service Provider`

`VCS     Version Control System`

`NA      National Accreditation`

`RCS     Remote Control System`

`IT      Information Technology`

`CRl     Certificate Revocation List`

`eIDAS   Electronic Identification, Authentication and Trust Services`

`CRY     Cryptography`

`SOTA    State of the Art`

# 4 PKI software contexts

| Name | Description |

| --- | --- |

| AE.Physical_Protection | Physical security commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains should be provided by the environment. Root CA CPOC TLM uses authorized personnel to continually monitor the facility housing equipment on a 7x24x365 basis. The operational environment (e.g. physical facility) should never be left unattended. The personnel of the operational environment should never have access to the secure areas of root CAs or SubCAs unless authorized. Equipment and data (HSM activation data backup of key pair computer log key ceremony script certificate request …) should always be protected from unauthorized access. The physical security mechanisms for equipment at a minimum should be in place to: ·         Monitor either manually or electronically for unauthorized intrusion at all times. ·         Ensure no unauthorized access to the hardware and activation data is permitted. ·         Ensure all removable media and paper containing sensitive plain-text information is stored in secure container. ·         Any individual non-authorized on permanent basis who is entering secure areas should not be left without oversight by an authorized employee of the facilities (i.e. root CA CPOC and TLM facilities) ·         Ensure an access log is maintained and inspected periodically. ·         Provide at least 2 layers of increasing security such as perimeter building and operational room. ·         Require two trusted role physical access controls to both the cryptographic HSM and activation data. |

| AE.Trusted_Admin | TOE administrators should follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner. |

| AE.Trusted_Hosts | It is assumed that the platform hosting the TOE is managed by a competent and trusted administrator and does not allow any attacker to access the hard disk when sensitive data are processed on the workstation by an authorized user. The user workstation must ensure effective protection against eavesdropping and unauthorized data transmission e.g.: correctly configured firewall up to-date antivirus software anti-spyware access to privileged accounts is protected all software security update have been installed and current version do not contain known vulnerabilities. It is assumed that there are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g. compilers or user applications) available on the TOE other than those services necessary for the operation administration and support of the TAE. |

| AE.Physical_Protection | Physical security commensurate with the value of the PKI and the data it contains should be provided by the environment. Root CA CPOC TLM uses authorized personnel to continually monitor the facility housing equipment on a 7x24x365 basis. The operational environment (e.g. physical facility) should never be left unattended. The personnel of the operational environment should never have access to the secure areas of root CAs or SubCAs unless authorized. Equipment and data (HSM activation data backup of key pair computer log key ceremony script certificate request …) should always be protected from unauthorized access. The physical security mechanisms for equipment at a minimum should be in place to: ·         Monitor either manually or electronically for unauthorized intrusion at all times. ·         Ensure no unauthorized access to the hardware and activation data is permitted. ·         Ensure all removable media and paper containing sensitive plain-text information is stored in secure container. ·         Any individual non-authorized on permanent basis who is entering secure areas should not be left without oversight by an authorized employee of the facilities (i.e. root CA CPOC and TLM facilities) ·         Ensure an access log is maintained and inspected periodically. ·         Provide at least 2 layers of increasing security such as perimeter building and operational room. ·         Require two trusted role physical access controls to both the cryptographic HSM and activation data. |

| AE.Trusted_Admin | PKI administrators should follow and apply all administrator guidance in a trusted manner. |

| AE.Trusted_Hosts | It is assumed that the platform hosting the PKI is managed by a competent and trusted administrator and does not allow any attacker to access the hard disk when sensitive data are processed on the workstation by an authorized user. The user workstation must ensure effective protection against eavesdropping and unauthorized data transmission e.g.: correctly configured firewall up to-date antivirus software anti-spyware access to privileged accounts is protected all software security update have been installed and current version do not contain known vulnerabilities. It is assumed that there are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g. compilers or user applications) available on the PKI other than those services necessary for the operation administration and support of the TAE. |

| AE.Auditors Review Audit Logs | Audit Logs should be reviewed in response to alerts based on irregularities and incidents within their CA systems and in addition periodically every year. Audit log is archived at least weekly. Log records related to certificate life cycles are kept at least five years after the corresponding certificate expires. |

| AE.HSM | The TOE environment provides a certified HSM which should be used for: ·         Generating using administering and storing of private keys Generating and using of random numbers (assessment of the random number generation function should be part of the security evaluation and certification) Creating backups of the private keys Deletion of private keys. The communication channel between the TOE and the HSM is physical secured (dedicated link). The cryptographic module should be certified with one of the following Protection Profiles (PPs) with the Assurance Level EAL-4 or higher: ·         PPs for HSMs: ·         CEN EN 419221-2: Protection profiles for TSP Cryptographic modules-- Part 2: o   Cryptographic Module for CSP signing operations with backup o   CEN EN 419221-4: Protection profiles for TSP Cryptographic modules-- Part 4: Cryptographic module for CSP signing operations without backup o   CEN EN 419221-5: Protection profiles for TSP Cryptographic modules-- Part 5: - Cryptographic Module for Trust Services ·         PPs for Smartcards: o   CEN EN 419211-2: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -- Part 2: Device with key generation o   CEN EN 419211-3: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 3: Device with key import |

| AE.Trusted_Time_Source | The runtime environment provides the TOE with exact date and time to ensure time stamp functions (audit traces generation request validity verification). |

| AE.Deployment | The TOE can be used to provide services to different kind of authorities. For each of those authority’s type the TOE should be correctly configured and should only provide services corresponding to the entity e.g. a RCA should not be able to deliver ATs an AA should not respond to EC requests etc. |

| AE.HSM | The PKI environment provides a certified HSM which should be used for: ·         Generating using administering and storing of private keys Generating and using of random numbers (assessment of the random number generation function should be part of the security evaluation and certification) Creating backups of the private keys Deletion of private keys. The communication channel between the PKI and the HSM is physical secured (dedicated link). The cryptographic module should be certified with one of the following Protection Profiles (PPs) with the Assurance Level EAL-4 or higher: ·         PPs for HSMs: ·         CEN EN 419221-2: Protection profiles for TSP Cryptographic modules-- Part 2: o   Cryptographic Module for CSP signing operations with backup o   CEN EN 419221-4: Protection profiles for TSP Cryptographic modules-- Part 4: Cryptographic module for CSP signing operations without backup o   CEN EN 419221-5: Protection profiles for TSP Cryptographic modules-- Part 5: - Cryptographic Module for Trust Services ·         PPs for Smartcards: o   CEN EN 419211-2: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -- Part 2: Device with key generation o   CEN EN 419211-3: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 3: Device with key import |

| AE.Trusted_Time_Source | The runtime environment provides the PKI with exact date and time to ensure time stamp functions (audit traces generation request validity verification). |

| AE.Deployment | The PKI can be used to provide services to different kind of authorities. For each of those authority’s type the PKI should be correctly configured and should only provide services corresponding to the entity e.g. a RCA should not be able to deliver ATs an AA should not respond to EC requests etc. |

<br />

| Name | Description | Related assets |

| --- | --- | --- |

| Remote attacker |

| T.MITM | A Remote attacker may exploit interactions between the TOE and the ITS-S to expose or tamper sensitive TOE or user data. | Canonical Public Key Enrolment Credential (EC) Authorization Ticket (AT) Canonical ID Tag HMAC key CRL CTL misbehavior report. |

| T.DOS | A Remote attacker disables communication between the TOE and the ITS station. | Software/execution of the software |

| T.MITM | A Remote attacker may exploit interactions between the PKI and the ITS-S to expose or tamper sensitive PKI or user data. | Canonical Public Key Enrolment Credential (EC) Authorization Ticket (AT) Canonical ID Tag HMAC key CRL CTL misbehavior report. |

| T.DOS | A Remote attacker disables communication between the PKI and the ITS station. | Software/execution of the software |

| T.ITS-S_Impersonation | A Remote attacker (Rogue ITS-S) sends fake requests in order to get valid EC and AT with forged attributes or fake MR in order to have targeted ITS-S to be considered misbehaving by the TAE. | EC AT MR |

| T.TrustListsReplay | A Remote attacker intercepts and respond to an ITS-S requesting for trust list (CRL CTL ECTL) updates by sending an old version. | CRL CTL ECTL |

| T.GlobalMisbehaviourReportingTampering | A Remote attacker may exploit interactions between the MA and the EA or AA in order to modify global misbehaving detection information in order to force wrong reaction either on correct ITS-S station or misbehaving stations. | MR CRL software |

| T.AuthorizationValidationProcessTampering | A Remote attacker may exploit interactions between the EA and AA in order to modify Authorization validation requests or responses to allow or deny inappropriate AT generation. | AT software |

| T.RegistrationTampering | A Remote attacker may exploit interactions between the manufacturer and the EA in order to modify or deny an ITS-S registration. | Canonical ID Canonical Public Key ITS-S Profile |

| Local attacker and Rogue Users |

| T.PrivateKeys | A Local attacker or Rogue user disclose or tamper to the TOE secrets i.e. Data encryption key or CA private keys. | Data encryption key CA private keys |

| T.Logs_Tampering | A Local attacker or Rogue user tries to modify the TOE’s Log File in order to hide its activities. | TSF Data |

| T.Logs_Discolsure | A Local attacker or Rogue user tries to gain access to the TOE’s Log File in order to gain sensitive information on the TOE’s security status and functions as well as other C-ITS stations. | TSF Data |

| T.PrivateKeys | A Local attacker or Rogue user disclose or tamper to the PKI secrets i.e. Data encryption key or CA private keys. | Data encryption key CA private keys |

| T.Logs_Tampering | A Local attacker or Rogue user tries to modify the TOE’s Log File in order to hide its activities. | PKI Data |

| T.Logs_Discolsure | A Local attacker or Rogue user tries to gain access to the TOE’s Log File in order to gain sensitive information on the TOE’s security status and functions as well as other C-ITS stations. | PKI Data |

| T.Configuration_Tampering | A Local attacker or Rogue user tries to modify the TOE’s Certificate Policy configuration data and therefore compromise the integrity of the TOE’s applications or communication security. | Certificate Policy configuration data |

| T.Stored_Certificates_Tampering | A Local attacker or Rogue user tries to modify stored CA Certificates Enrolment Credential (EC) Authorization Ticket (AT) TLM certificate content and therefore compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the TOE’s communications. | CA Certificates Enrolment Credential (EC) Authorization Ticket (AT) TLM certificate |

| All attackers |

| T.Adminstrators_Impersonation | An attacker (Remote attacker Local attacker or Rogue user) may gain access to TOE information by impersonating an authorized user or via privilege escalation of the TOE and thus disclose or manipulate TOE assets. | Canonical Public Key CA Certificates Enrolment Credential (EC) Authorization Ticket (AT) TLM certificate Canonical ID Tag HMAC key Certificate Policy configuration CRL CTL ITS-S Profile ECTL. |

| T.Adminstrators_Impersonation | An attacker (Remote attacker Local attacker or Rogue user) may gain access to PKI information by impersonating an authorized user or via privilege escalation of the PKI and thus disclose or manipulate PKI assets. | Canonical Public Key CA Certificates Enrolment Credential (EC) Authorization Ticket (AT) TLM certificate Canonical ID Tag HMAC key Certificate Policy configuration CRL CTL ITS-S Profile ECTL. |

| T.Software_Tampering | A Local or Remote attacker tries to modify the TOE’s software and therefore compromise the integrity of the TOE’s applications. | Software |

<br />

        ◦ The requests can be correctly decrypted and the signature is valid with respect to the validated EA and AA Certificates

        ◦ The Message format is conformant to [\[5\]](#_ref_5)  section 6.2.3.4.1

].

   - RATIONALE: The PKI shall provide protected communication channels for remote administrators, IT entities such as car manufacturer servers (confidentiality and integrity) and other parts of a distributed TOE (confidentiality, integrity and authenticity). This covers threats: T.MITM  and T.DOS. 

   - RATIONALE: The PKI shall provide protected communication channels for remote administrators, IT entities such as car manufacturer servers (confidentiality and integrity) and other parts of a distributed PKI (confidentiality, integrity and authenticity). This covers threats: T.MITM  and T.DOS. 

  - APPLICABILITY: UC4.