Commit f0c21a44 authored by Santeri Toikka's avatar Santeri Toikka
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5.2 Refactoring

parent f611c284
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+26 −20
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@@ -652,11 +652,12 @@ Technical requirements:
-   **[REQ-TECH-1]** The product is shipped without undocumented interfaces.
-   **[REQ-TECH-2]** Any administrative action shall be recorded for audit purposes.
-   **[REQ-TECH-3]** A secure channel is used in transport.
-   **[REQ-TECH-4]** Cryptographic keys can be changed.
-   **[REQ-TECH-5]** All system components are synchronized to the same time.
-   **[REQ-TECH-6]** All system clocks are monitored.
-   **[REQ-TECH-4]** Cryptographic keys can be rotated.
-   **[REQ-TECH-5]** Cryptographic keys can be replaced with user controlled keys.
-   **[REQ-TECH-6]** All system components are synchronized to the same time.
-   **[REQ-TECH-7]** All system clocks are monitored.

**Table 5.2-1: Technical cybersecurity requirements**
**Table 5.2-1: Technical cybersecurity assesments and details**

| Requirement      | Assesment                                                                                                    |
| :--------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
@@ -668,7 +669,23 @@ Technical requirements:
| **[REQ-TECH-5]** |                                                                                                              |
| **[REQ-TECH-6]** |                                                                                                              |

<br />
The listed requirement shall be implemented, if the risk of the given factor is defined as follows.
When multiple factors define a different level, the lowest level shall be selected.
A product which risk factor is evaluated to be medium, shall implement both low and medium requirements.
A product which risk factor is evaluated to be high, shall implement all mapped requirements.

**Table 5.2-2: Technical cybersecurity requirements**

| Name         | [SRU]  | [Complexity] | [Segment] | [NIS2] |
| :----------- | :----- | ------------ | --------- | ------ |
| [REQ-TECH-0] | low    | low          | low       | low    |
| [REQ-TECH-1] | low    | low          | low       | low    |
| [REQ-TECH-2] | medium | medium       | medium    | medium |
| [REQ-TECH-3] | low    | low          | low       | low    |
| [REQ-TECH-4] | low    | low          | low       | low    |
| [REQ-TECH-5] | high   | medium       | n/a       | high   |
| [REQ-TECH-6] | high   | high         | medium    | medium |
| [REQ-TECH-7] | high   | high         | high      | high   |

### 5.2.1 Secure channel definition

@@ -684,8 +701,6 @@ The chosen method shall follow the intent in the CRA by protecting the data tran
| Appropriate cryptographic libraries are used | See [5.2.4 Appropriate cryptographic libraries](#524-appropriate-cryptographic-libraries) |
| Mutual trust                                 | All endpoints in a secure channel can cryptographically verify others.                    |

<br />

Mutual trust is in plural form not exlucing IP Multicast or Anycast usage if implemented.

![Figure 5.2.1-1: Secure channel example with TLS](./media/52_secure_channel_example.drawio.png)
@@ -717,8 +732,6 @@ ZeroTrust routing is also encouraged where applicable.

### 5.2.4 Appropriate cryptographic libraries

<mark>AMS: Markku, Ivan and Claire are focusing on this. Skip for now.</mark>

Cryptographic libraries, primitivies and constructions shall follow ENISA's Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms [\[1\]](#_ref_1).
Manufacturer shall enable by default only the recommended designs that are fit for use-case. Any designs that are not fit for use-case may only be enabled after the user has been sufficiently informed of the security consequences in a manner that takes the use-case into account.

@@ -776,18 +789,11 @@ Reflecting to [List of Risk Factors](#451-list-of-risk-factors) defined in this

**Table 5.3.2-1: Mitigation requirements**

| Name           | ACC-L-0         | ACC-L-1               | ACC-L-2                  | ACC-L-3                                |
| :------------- | :-------------- | :-------------------- | :----------------------- | :------------------------------------- |
| Network        | Air gapped      | Single public endoint | Multiple endpoints       | Everything else                        |
| [REQ-TECH-0]   | Required        | Required              | Required                 | Required                               |
| [REQ-TECH-1]   | Required        | Required              | Required                 | Required                               |
| [REQ-TECH-2]   | Required        | Required              | Required                 | Required                               |
| [REQ-TECH-3]   | Self-signed TLS | TLS in the endpoint   | TLS in exposed endpoints | Technical documentation responsibility |
| [REQ-TECH-4]   | Required        | Required              | Required                 | Required                               |
| [REQ-INGEST-0] | Data signing    | Data signing          | Data signing             | Data signing                           |
| [REQ-INGEST-1] | Data signing    | Data signing          | Data signing             | Data signing                           |

<br />
| Name           | [SRU]  | [Complexity] | [Segment] | [NIS2] |
| :------------- | :----- | ------------ | --------- | ------ |
| [REQ-INGEST-0] | medium | medium       | medium    | medium |
| [REQ-INGEST-1] | high   | medium       | medium    | high   |

Note that in a closed system, where the confindentiality doesn't require transport encryption, the data integrity does require at least signing of the data set with cryptographically good enough keying.