Commit 65b900eb authored by Santeri Toikka's avatar Santeri Toikka
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Added placeholders for logging and HA

parent 98153292
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+47 −18
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ The chosen method shall follow the intent in the CRA by protecting the data tran

Mutual trust is in plural form not exlucing IP Multicast or Anycast usage if implemented.

![Secure channle example with TLS](./media/52_secure_channel_example.drawio.png)
![Secure channel example with TLS](./media/52_secure_channel_example.drawio.png)

The figure above is an illustratoin of a simple TLS protected communication between NMS and the managed device.
The device initiates the connection towards reachable endpoint based on a DNS address configured into the managed device.
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ Reflecting to [List of Risk Factors](#451-list-of-risk-factors) defined in this

| Name     | ACC-L-0         | ACC-L-1                | ACC-L-2                  | ACC-L-3                                |
| -------- | --------------- | ---------------------- | ------------------------ | -------------------------------------- |
| Style    | Air gapped      | Single public endoint  | Multiple endpoints       | Everything else                        |
| Network  | Air gapped      | Single public endoint  | Multiple endpoints       | Everything else                        |
| [RQ-3]   | Required        | Required               | Required                 | Required                               |
| [RQ-4]   | Required        | Required               | Required                 | Required                               |
| [RQ-5]   | Required        | Required               | Required                 | Required                               |
@@ -659,6 +659,35 @@ Pull style configuration updates:
-   **[UPDT-1]** Verify integrity of the upddate before installation (hash checks).
-   **[UPDT-2]** Use secure channels for update delivery (e.g., TLS).

### 5.3.x High Availability

Unwanted traffic in the interfaces can cause a denial of service from the managed elements.

### 5.3.x Logging

-   **[LOG-0]** All system components are synchronized to a same time.
-   **[LOG-1]** From the system perspective, logs and traces are stored into a write only service.
-   **[LOG-2]** The write only log or tracing storage is deployed outside of the system deployment context.
-   **[LOG-3]** NMS emits SIEM events from relevant changes.
-   **[LOG-4]** SIEM transfer format, field attributes and event descriptions are available as part of the technical documentation.

| Name                  | [EXP-L-0]     | [EXP-L-1]      | [EXP-L-2]      |
| --------------------- | ------------- | -------------- | -------------- |
| Entity classification | Undefined     | NIS2 important |  NIS2 critical |
| [LOG-0]               | Required      | Required       | Required       |
| [LOG-1]               | Required      | Required       | Required       |
| [LOG-2]               | Not required  | Not required   | Required       |
| [LOG-3]               | Not required  | Required       | Required       |
| [LOG-4]               | Not required  | Required       | Required       |

| Requirement | Assesment                                                                             |
| ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| [LOG-0]     | All system clocks are synchronized into a NTP server or similar.                      |
| [LOG-1]     | From the process, it is impossible to overwrite the log output.                       |
| [LOG-2]     | Technical documentation specifies how to integrate into an external logging system.   |
| [LOG-3]     | Detailed information of all emitted events is available.                              |
| [LOG-4]     | National MSAs are able to validate the system design comformity without a deployment. |

# 6 Security Profiles

## 6.1 General
@@ -668,7 +697,7 @@ Pull style configuration updates:
> Table mapping technical security requirements from Section 5 of the present document to essential cybersecurity requirements in Annex I of the CRA. The purpose of this is to help identify missing technical security requirements.

| CRA requirement                                 | Technical security requirements(s)                |
| ----------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------- |
| ----------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- |
| No known exploitable vulnerabilities            |                                                   |
| Secure design, development, production          |                                                   |
| Secure by default configuration                 |                                                   |
@@ -678,10 +707,10 @@ Pull style configuration updates:
| Integrity protection for data and configuration | [5.3.2],[5.3.3]                                   |
| Data minimization                               |                                                   |
| Availability protection                         |                                                   |
| Minimize impact on other devices or services    |                                    |
| Minimize impact on other devices or services    | [5.3.x High Availability](#53x-high-availability) |
| Limit attack surface                            |                                                   |
| Exploit mitigation by limiting incident impact  |                                                   |
| Logging and monitoring mechanisms               |                                    |
| Logging and monitoring mechanisms               | [5.3.x Logging](#53x-logging)                     |
| Secure deletion and data transfer               |                                                   |

[5.3.1]: (#531-mitigations-for-user-identity-integrity)