@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ The security analysis in this Annex represents a risk assessment done by the sta
A list of product assets are used to identify potential threats to the product. The assumptions are used to define the scope of potential threats that are addressed by this security analysis.
Risk factor levels for each use case are determined by using the operational coenvironment of each use case to choose a risk factor level that most accurately represents the highest risk for that use case. The use case is determined by the intended purpose and reasonably foreseeable use specified by the manufacturer.
Risk factor levels for each use case are determined by using the operational coenvironment of each use case to choose a risk factor level that most accurately represents the highest risk for that use case. The use case is determined by the intended purpose of the product specified by the manufacturer.
For each threat, a formula based on the risk factor levels is used to calculate the likelihood and impact of the threat. This security analysis uses the likelihood and impact of each threat to identify specific technical requirements that treat that risk.
Description: Exposure of manufacturer infrastructure responsible for essential functions of the product
Rationale: Rationale: More users accessing manufacturer infrastructure increases likelihood of an attack via hardware interfaces.
Rationale: More users accessing manufacturer infrastructure increases likelihood of an attack via hardware interfaces.
***[RDP-0]** Manufacturer does not provide any remote data processing
***[RDP-1]** Manufacturer provides RDPS via self-hosted infrastructure
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ Rationale: More features mean more code and more interfaces mean attack surface.
***[COM-1]** Usage requires a few additional features related to tunnelling encrypted traffic
***[COM-2]** Usage requires many additional features
Guidance: At present, the complexity of the implementation and the exposed interfaces are accounted for in a single risk factor. This is sufficienty for the security analysis in the present document but may need to separated into two risk factors for future versions.
Guidance: At present, the complexity of the implementation and the exposed interfaces are accounted for in a single risk factor. This is sufficient for the security analysis in the present document but may need to separated into two risk factors for future versions.
@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ This requirement applies to VPNs where the product handles credentials, VPN clie
#### 5.6.6.1 Requirement
1.**REQ-AAC-06 (MI-AUTH-5)-1** The VPN service shall provide a method to force revocation, temporary or permanent, of authorization of an endpoint by an authorized user, and
1.**REQ-AAC-06 (MI-AUTH-5)-1** The VPN shall provide a method to force revocation, temporary or permanent, of authorization of an endpoint by an authorized user, and
2.**REQ-AAC-06 (MI-AUTH-5)-2** the revocation of authorization of the VPN client shall end the VPN connection for that client by the time the revocation indicates it has completed.
> NOTE: In scenarios where credential revocation is a globally distributed process, it may be beneficial to inform the user of a successful submitted credential revocation in addition to informing the user once the process has been completed. For use cases where endpoints are already restricted from being connected to each other, this might be a non-blocking background operation that occurs while the user continues their activities.
