- De-anonymize using stuff in the unencrypted header that is unique to user
- Document the purpose of each field and whether or not it could be used to identify the user, by itself or in combination with other fields
- Reduce the number of fields to the point where they cannot uniquely identify more than 1% of the total users? (or zero fields)
**TODO: specific known attack vectors to apply to appropriate requirements**
- Credential harvesting
- phishing
- not our problem
- transmitting credentials in plain text
- TR: don't transmit sensitive stuff in plain text
Requirement: for each method of authenticating and each transport method, authenticate, capture the traffic, search for a string matching the plain-text credentials. and document it all
- Logging
- TR: send logs to a remote server
- compromised devices
- TR: require AV, XDR, SIEM, SOAR, etc.
- TR: threat detection (traffic analysis)
- require AV, XDR, SIEM, SOAR, etc. or provide it yourself
- there is an API or something
- it must provide security at X level
- ??? how to make this connect to use case/security profiled/overall risk? Overall risk score?
- If you see a bunch of data being exfiltrated through a laptop, it's suspicious - this can be provided by a SIEM, firewall, etc.
- connecting to masquerading server
- TR: pre-shared certificates
- TR: secrets or certificates or fingerprints pre-shared or transmitted by alternate secure channel
Test: Set up an unauthorized server, send it the traffic from the clients, capture the traffic from the clients and see if they sent anything they shouldn't have, check if the clients refused to connect
- TR: client authentication cannot send any confidential information to the server before the client has authenticated the server
Test: Same as above, with all authentication methods
- weak encryption
- TR: use strong encryption (ref existing standards)
- saving traffic and decrypting later
@@ -100,7 +122,7 @@ how does split tunneling pose a security threat relevant to this document? maybe
- see above
- unauthorised collection of PII by client
- TR: examine data sent by VPN software that is "metadata" (not created by user)
- unauthorised filtering or tampering of traffic (mitm)
- unauthorised filtering or tampering of traffic (pitm)
- see previous TRs
- installer vulnerabilities e.g. put wrong library in path
- TR: validate things needed by the installer with a hash or similar
