Verified Commit 0e3b2d6b authored by Aki Braun's avatar Aki Braun
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Editorial: links

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@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ A VPN management server provides a way for network administrators to control con
* Access control: policies that permit or deny certain traffic within the network.
* Monitoring and logging: configuration logs, network logs, telemetry used for troubleshooting.

The management server typically maintains configuration of the whole network and provides configuration to individual clients at the time of connection (authentication, address assignment, routes, etc). In VPNs using a hub-and-spoke topology, management server is often implemented as part of the VPN server. For consumer and small-business use cases as described in 4.6, this server is considered remote data processing and fully controlled by the manufacturer. Mesh networks may use a management server operated by the manufacturer as part of their remote data processing solution, or may handle all management in a peer-to-peer fashion.
The management server typically maintains configuration of the whole network and provides configuration to individual clients at the time of connection (authentication, address assignment, routes, etc). In VPNs using a hub-and-spoke topology, management server is often implemented as part of the VPN server. For consumer and small-business use cases as described in [clause 4.6](#use-cases), this server is considered remote data processing and fully controlled by the manufacturer. Mesh networks may use a management server operated by the manufacturer as part of their remote data processing solution, or may handle all management in a peer-to-peer fashion.

## 4.3 Operational Environment

@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ See [\[i.3\]](#_ref_i.3) for formal definitions of micro, small, and medium-size
* **Description:**
  * **Product type:** Software that operates as a VPN client.
  * **Function:** Tunnels encrypted traffic to avoid tracking and eavesdropping on public or untrusted networks.
  * **Users:** Everyday Consumers and Vulnerable Groups (as defined in 4.5).
  * **Users:** Everyday Consumers and Vulnerable Groups (as defined in [clause 4.5](#users)).
  * **Architecture:** Client installed on personal devices (mobile phones, portable or desktop computers) communicating with exit nodes managed by the manufacturer. Does not connect endpoints with other endpoints directly.
  * **Operational environment:** Untrusted access networks.

@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ See [\[i.3\]](#_ref_i.3) for formal definitions of micro, small, and medium-size
* **Description:**
  * **Product type:** Software that operates as a VPN client (and optionally software that operates as a VPN Gateway).
  * **Function:** Tunnels encrypted traffic to user-managed infrastructure, or to manufacturer-managed exit nodes.
  * **Users:** Everyday Consumers (as defined in 4.5).
  * **Users:** Everyday Consumers (as defined in [clause 4.5](#users)).
  * **Architecture:** Client typically installed on a router or other network level to protect the household. The VPN infrastructure may be entirely owned, rented, or managed by the user, OR the client may communicate with exit nodes managed by the manufacturer. Does not connect endpoints with other endpoints directly.
  * **Operational environment:** Private home networks.

@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ See [\[i.3\]](#_ref_i.3) for formal definitions of micro, small, and medium-size
* **Description:**
  * **Product type:** Software that operates as a VPN client.
  * **Function:** Advanced privacy preservation and surveillance evasion.
  * **Users:** High-Risk Privacy Seekers (as defined in 4.5).
  * **Users:** High-Risk Privacy Seekers (as defined in [clause 4.5](#users)).
  * **Architecture:** Client installed on personal devices. Strict endpoint isolation (does not connect endpoints with other endpoints directly).
  * **Operational environment:** Hostile networks with high risk of surveillance.

@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ See [\[i.3\]](#_ref_i.3) for formal definitions of micro, small, and medium-size
* **Description:**
  * **Product type:** VPN client and remote data processing software.
  * **Function:** Secure connection to cloud resources with manufacturer-managed configuration.
  * **Users:** Small Organization Users (as defined in 4.5).
  * **Users:** Small Organization Users (as defined in [clause 4.5](#users)).
  * **Architecture:** Requires managed service for configuration and maintenance. May connect endpoints with other endpoints directly.
  * **Operational environment:** Small enterprise networks with limited or no full-time IT/network administration. Not critical for core business operations.

@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ See [\[i.3\]](#_ref_i.3) for formal definitions of micro, small, and medium-size
* **Description:**
  * **Product type:** VPN client, gateway, and server software.
  * **Function:** Enterprise-wide secure overlay network.
  * **Users:** Enterprise Integrators and Administrators (as defined in 4.5).
  * **Users:** Enterprise Integrators and Administrators (as defined in [clause 4.5](#users)).
  * **Architecture:** Requires managed service for configuration and maintenance, typically from manufacturer. Connects endpoints with other endpoints directly.
  * **Operational environment:** Critical for business operations, managed by full-time IT/network administration.

@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ The security analysis in this annex represents a risk assessment done by the sta

A list of product assets are used to identify potential threats to the product. The assumptions are used to define the scope of potential threats that are addressed by this security analysis.

Risk factor levels for each use case are determined by using the operational coenvironment of each use case to choose a risk factor level that most accurately represents the highest risk for that use case. The use case is determined by the intended purpose of the product specified by the manufacturer.
Risk factor levels for each use case are determined by using the operational coenvironment of each use case to choose a risk factor level that most accurately represents the highest risk for that use case (see [clause 4](#product-context), product context). The use case is determined by the intended purpose of the product specified by the manufacturer.

For each threat, a formula based on the risk factor levels is used to calculate the likelihood and impact of the threat. This security analysis uses the likelihood and impact of each threat to identify specific technical requirements that treat that risk.

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@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ Not all requirements are universally applicable: The applicability of requiremen

Some risks may be transferred partially or fully to other components of the system or the user of the product. When that is the case, mitigations that transfer the risk will be included as an option to fulfill a cybersecurity requirement, depending on the use case and risk factors.

[//]: # (TODO delete note, renumber)

> NOTE: Requirements are numbered for ease of reference to align with clause numbers, as a result requirement numbering begins with 02.

## 5.2 Appropriate level of cybersecurity
@@ -20,9 +22,7 @@ In alignment with the Cyber Resilience Act Annex I Part I (1), this section addr

#### 5.2.1.2 Secure software design and development (MI-FZ95, MI-BTIN)

Use cases (as described in [clause 4.6](#use-cases) and [annex B](#annex-b-informative-security-analysis)) determine which of these controls should be utilized to mitigate threats around secure software design and development. In particular, across all use cases only one—at most—of the following two is called for when applied to a single product: REQ-SSD-03 (MI-FZ95) or REQ-SSD-04 (MI-BTIN). See B.TK for more information.

[//]: # (TODO link B.TK above)
Use cases (as described in [clause 4.6](#use-cases) and [annex B](#annex-b-informative-security-analysis)) determine which of these controls should be utilized to mitigate threats around secure software design and development. In particular, across all use cases only one—at most—of the following two is called for when applied to a single product: REQ-SSD-03 (MI-FZ95) or REQ-SSD-04 (MI-BTIN). See [clause B.4.3](#b.4.3-th-uevu-unknown-exploitable-vulnerabilities) for more information.

### 5.2.3 REQ-SSD-03 (MI-FZ95) Memory access error prevention

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@@ -140,9 +140,9 @@ Table R.3: Assets to Threats mapping

### R.4.1 Applicability of Annex R requirements

The requirements in the present clause address the protection of the security properties identified for the assets in clause R.3.2.
The requirements in the present clause address the protection of the security properties identified for the assets in [clause R.3.2](#r.3.2-assets).

Where a security property is identified as relevant for a given asset in the asset tables of clause R.3.2, the corresponding requirement family or families in the present clause shall be considered for applicability to that asset.
Where a security property is identified as relevant for a given asset in the asset tables of [clause R.3.2](#r.3.2-assets), the corresponding requirement family or families in the present clause shall be considered for applicability to that asset.

For **DA-RDPS-001**, the primary requirement families considered for applicability are:

@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ Table R.4: Threats ↔ Requirements mapping

### R.5.1 Overview

The assessment cases in the present clause are aligned with the requirements in clause R.4. Each assessment case follows a common structure: assessment reference, assessment objective, assessment preparation, assessment activities, assessment verdict, and assessment evidence.
The assessment cases in the present clause are aligned with the requirements in [clause R.4](#r.4-security-requirements). Each assessment case follows a common structure: assessment reference, assessment objective, assessment preparation, assessment activities, assessment verdict, and assessment evidence.

### R.5.2 Local product side assessments